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Grown from the Shadows: How
Technology and Taxes Can Bring
Private Companies into the Public
Light
ABSTRACT
The initial public offering (IPO) has started to make a comeback,
but in forms that require less oversight and at a later point in a
company’s lifecycle. These new trends cut main street investors out of
early-stage corporate growth and have imperiled the fortunes and
retirement funds of a generation. One of the most significant
precipitating factors in this new dynamic is electronic private markets
that allow sophisticated investors to trade pre-IPO shares. These
electronic private markets provide liquidity to institutional investors,
which relieves institutional pressure on companies to go public. The
current approaches to IPO reform are primarily deregulatory, and they
do not address the role of electronic private markets.
This Note proposes a tax incentive that would allow investors to
defer capital gains on shares that trade on an electronic private market
and then go public within a limited window. Investors would receive tax
deferral on these “Opportunity Securities” only if they reinvest their
proceeds in another qualifying private company or IPO. These
requirements would reignite the IPO pipeline. The incentive would apply
to private market investors as well as main street investors who buy
shares within one year of the IPO. Opportunity Securities would
encourage companies to go public sooner because investors would be
motivated to seek this tax deferral and pressure companies accordingly.
Unlike other proposals, this solution would encourage IPOs and align
the incentives of heterogenous investors without sacrificing disclosure or
investor protections.
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Imagine a scenario where entrepreneurial and tech-savvy law
professors or recent law school graduates spotted an opportunity of a
lifetime, the next Amazon.com, and they were able to buy shares in the
company’s Initial Public Offering (IPO). By spotting this growth
opportunity, they were able to sell five to ten years later and help fund
a new academic institute or launch the newest legal tech start-up. This
is no longer a reality.1 If these same people spotted the next big
emerging company today, they would likely be shut out of the market.2
They might not be accredited investors who can buy shares in a
company that is not publicly traded,3 or even if they are accredited, they
1.
See Scott Austin, Stephanie Stamm & Rolfe Winkler, Uber Jackpot: Inside One of the
Greatest Startup Investments of All Time, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-jackpotinside-one-of-the-greatest-startup-investments-of-all-time-11557496421 [https://perma.cc/X2Y3FVLF] (last updated May 10, 2019 12:14 PM); Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private
Capital and the Decline of the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 456–57 (2017); Jeff
Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 543–46 (2012).
2.
See Austin, et al., supra note 1 (describing the Uber IPO and how many investors tied
into the Silicon Valley investing and technology community were able to invest in the company
early on, unlike public investors).
3.
Updated Investor Bulletin: Accredited Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 31,
2019) [hereinafter Investor Bulletin: Accredited Investors], https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/updated-investor-bulletin-accredited-investors
[https://perma.cc/7HR7-UGZM]. In order to participate in nearly all of the offerings at issue in this
Note, an individual must be an accredited investor. Id. In order to qualify as an individual
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might not have the requisite social or business connections to buy
shares.4 This is not a distant capitalist doomsday scenario but an
ever-increasing reality and a constraint on investor access and
economic growth. This Note explains how a creative yet rarely explored
solution can help to resolve a deteriorating legal and economic
problem.5
Since the dot-com boom of the late 1990s, the United States’
securities markets have seen a marked decline in the number of
companies selling their shares in IPOs.6 One reason for this trend is
that investors who hold these private securities are now able to
liquidate them through Electronic Private Markets (EPMs).7 EPMs
provide a platform to buy and sell privately held securities.8 Privately
held securities are often called private securities or exempted
securities.9 These securities fall within certain exemptions for
registration with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).10
SEC registration is expensive, often burdensome, and has high costs
and benefits.11 Through a synthesis of technologies,12 EPMs are able to
accredited, the investor must have earned income above $200,000 in the prior year or have a
household net worth above $1 million excluding a primary residence. Id. These financial
thresholds underlie the problem with sustained private company status by limiting investor access
on strong policy grounds. Id. By staying private longer, accredited investors receive greater growth
opportunities in companies that often become household mainstays, leaving public shareholders
with lower future prospects. Cf. Begum Erdogan, Rishi Kant, Allen Miller & Kara Sprague, Grow
Fast or Die Slow: Why Unicorns Are Staying Private, MCKINSEY & CO. (May 11, 2016) [hereinafter
McKinsey Staying Private Report], mckinsey.com/industries/technology-media-and-telecommunications/our-insights/grow-fast-or-die-slow-why-unicorns-are-staying-private
[https://perma.cc/
ZS42-UDJP].
4.
Cf. Austin, et al., supra note 1 (implying that the typical early start-up investors that
are able to capture real growth premiums are institutional venture capitalists with long-standing
social and economic ties to Silicon Valley).
5.
See infra Part III.
6.
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 543–46.
7.
See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 36–39
(2012).
8.
See id.
9.
See SCOTT BAUGUESS, RACHITA GULLAPALLI & VLADIMIR IVANOV, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED
SECURITIES
OFFERINGS,
2009–2017
40
(Aug.
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/files/
DERA%20white%20paper_Regulation%20D_082018.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE26-P6U6]; Zachary
J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L. REV. 745, 747–48,
751 (2013).
10.
See Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 39–42; cf. R. Kevin Saunders II, Note, Power to the
People: How the SEC Can Empower the Crowd, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 945, 951–55 (2014)
(discussing exemption and the regulation of private securities in the context of crowdfunding).
11.
See, e.g., Fontenay, supra note 1, at 445, 447–48 (describing the increasing
requirements of public company compliance as a result of the SEC registration process).
12.
See Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 37–39.
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aggregate and intermediate between buyers and sellers at efficiencies
that were not seen in the broker-to-broker transactions for private
securities that predated EPMs.13 The largest issuers of these kinds of
securities, by the number of offerings, are companies in the technology
industry.14 By tapping into the power of EPMs, this Note proposes an
Opportunity Securities Program (OSP) to encourage companies to
register and publicly offer their securities on the world’s largest stock
exchanges.15 Those who invest before—and for a limited time after—a
company’s IPO will be able to defer capital gains tax on the sale of those
investments so long as the proceeds from the sale are reinvested in
another company that qualifies for the OSP.
Scholars have narrowly focused on deregulation and disclosure
reform as the only effective ways to revive the IPO and decrease the
amount of time a company spends being privately held.16 This Note
builds on a simple recommendation by the SEC to reduce the capital
gains tax on shares purchased during an IPO.17 Instead of creating or
eliminating new securities regulations, this approach will take
advantage of EPMs—as a technological intermediary—and the tax code
to stimulate investor demand for IPOs.18 The OSP will allow investors
to defer capital gains on stock that is traded on an EPM and undergoes
an IPO within a reasonable period of time.19 Investors will receive this
tax benefit during a defined timeframe that includes earlier private
investors and investors who invest in the IPO.20 This is in opposition to
13.
See id. at 36–39.
14.
See BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 9, at 29 (“Issuers from the Technology industry group
are the most active amongst non-fund issuers by number of offerings, comprising about 25% of all
reported non-fund offerings (Figure 14) in the Regulation D market.”); see also id. at 2 n.2 (defining
start-up as “any rapid-growth private company, which is often technology driven, that seeks
funding from angel investors, venture capitalists, or venture lenders with the ultimate goal of exit
through an IPO or trade sale.”).
15.
See infra Section III.C.1.
16.
See Fontenay, supra note 1, at 452–55 (describing the IPO slowdown as a mostly US
phenomenon); Saunders, supra note 10, at 970–75; Gubler, supra note 9, at 788–90; Schwartz,
supra note 1, at 579–81, 598–602.
17.
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IPO TASK FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO
ON-RAMP: PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES AND THE JOB MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH
30 (Oct. 20, 2011) [hereinafter REBUILDING THE IPO], https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/rebuilding_the_ipo_on-ramp.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZWQ-YEJH] (presenting the entirety of the
SEC’s recommendation stating, “[p]olicymakers can reinforce demand for emerging growth stocks
by lowering the capital gains rate for investors who purchase shares in an IPO and hold these
shares for a minimum of two years. The capital gains tax rate has served as an effective tool for
encouraging and rewarding long-term investing for decades, so this action would be wholly
consistent with current practice.”); infra Part III.
18.
See infra Part III.
19.
See infra Section III.C.2.
20.
See infra Section III.C.2.
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the traditional academic debate around stimulating company demand
for an IPO through deregulation or modified disclosure requirements.21
The OSP will realign and incentivize EPMs to no longer act as holding
areas or acquisition hunting grounds,22 but rather as stepping-stones to
public participation in emerging company growth and innovation.
Part I discusses the technological, economic, and legal
circumstances that surround the downfall of the IPO in the securities
markets. Part II analyzes the current and proposed attempts to remedy
the problem. Following that analysis, Part III proposes the
demand-based OSP to stimulate public equity offerings in the United
States. It considers the mechanics of this program, as well as its unique
benefits and challenges, with a specific focus on why this solution may
work where others have failed.23
I. BACKGROUND
This Part will discuss the legal and economic underpinnings that
provide structure to the private market. First, it will discuss the EPM
and its fundamental role within this Note. Then, it will discuss the
regulatory backdrop that can constrain a company’s capital raising
efforts and why that encourages companies to raise money in the
private market. It will then discuss the recent history and underlying
economics of the IPO market.
A. The Star of the Show: Electronic Private Markets
EPMs are digital platforms that enable the purchase and sale of
private securities.24 EPMs are often managed by well-known names in
the financial industry, such as NASDAQ.25 In their most basic form,
they provide a matching service and gatekeeping function.26 They
ensure that anyone using the platform meets SEC requirements, and
they work to match buyers and sellers.27 Additionally, they provide
advice to companies and individuals who would like to buy or sell large
blocks of private securities.28 These blocks of securities are usually the

21.
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1, at 579–81, 598–602.
22.
See Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 36.
23.
See infra Part III.
24.
Cf. Nasdaq Private Market Solutions, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/solutions/nasdaq-private-market [https://perma.cc/4ZZJ-JSE3] (last visited Oct. 2, 2020).
25.
See Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 37 n.144.
26.
See Nasdaq Private Market Solutions, supra note 24.
27.
See id.
28.
See id.

194

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 23:1:189

result of a venture capital investment or employee compensation from
a privately held company.29
EPMs are not regulated as stock exchanges, but as
broker-dealers.30 As broker-dealers, EPMs are able to provide
liquidity31 in securities that do not have to be registered with the SEC.32
Prior to their digitization, the broker-dealers that ran these EPMs were
said to provide “secondary markets” within the private or exempted
securities field.33 Prior to the proliferation of EPMs, private securities
were difficult to buy and sell.34 Most private securities holders were
institutional investors, company founders, venture capital firms (VCs),
and early company employees, often based in Silicon Valley.35
The volume of trading and digital attributes of EPMs
differentiates them from traditional secondary market liquidity
providers, such as broker-to-broker transactions and investment bank
buyouts.36 Broker-to-broker transactions do not have the same impact
on private markets as EPMs because they involve singular, discrete
transactions.37
One of the large benefits of EPMs is that they are able to
aggregate buyers, sellers, and issues at a scale that is not realistic for
individual broker transactions.38 Buyouts, also called “trade sales”
when the buyer is in the same industry, are another traditional exit
opportunity that differ from EPMs.39 Buyouts require the issuer to sell
the entire company and, as a result, lose corporate control.40 Buyouts
are also not an effective way to cash out current employees’ stock
29.
See Gubler, supra note 9, at 760–61.
30.
See Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 36–39.
31.
Liquidity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The quality, state, or condition
of being readily convertible to cash. 2. Securities. The characteristic of having enough units in the
market that large transactions can occur without substantial price variations.”).
32.
See Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 41–43.
33.
See id. at 3–4.
34.
See id. at 37–39.
35.
See Fontenay, supra note 1, at 451 n.21, 471; Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 16, 20. EPMs
are an outgrowth of alternative trading systems (ATS), often called dark pools. See 17
C.F.R. § 242.300 (2020); Edwin Batista, A Shot in the Dark: An Analysis of the SEC’s Response to
the Rise of Dark Pools, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 83, 92–93 (2014). As opposed to EPMs, a traditional
ATS oftentimes facilitates trades in public securities outside of a traditional national stock
exchange. Id. at 92.
36.
See Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 37–39. This Note will refer to these secondary markets
as EPMs to delineate the secondary market actors who provide liquidity mainly through electronic
platforms and the internet.
37.
See id. at 36–39.
38.
See id. at 37–39.
39.
See id. at 10.
40.
See id. at 7–8.

2020]

OPPORTUNITY ZONE FOR PUBLIC LISTINGS

195

options or raise working capital for the business to grow and operate
independently.41
EPMs digitize what used to be a broker-to-broker process of
selling private securities.42 The largest EPM player is NASDAQ Private
Market.43 In developing its EPM, NASDAQ combined its infrastructure
managing the NASDAQ Exchange with its connections to its deep client
base.44 The largest advantage of this digital platform is its aggregation
function.45 The EPM also provides the necessary regulatory and
logistical support while matching buyers and sellers from its client lists
and members.46 NASDAQ Private Market aggregates individual sales
into offerings for a block of securities and, thus, has an efficiency of
scale.47 NASDAQ Private Market and other EPMs, such as SharesPost,
are responding to a demand for liquidity within the constraints of
securities regulation and exemption.48 As a result, much of the value
created by emerging growth companies (EGCs) in the United States is
captured by those with access to privately held securities.49
The proliferation of EPMs created a newfound liquidity in
previously thinly traded private securities.50 As a result, companies are
pushing off or foregoing IPOs, often allowing investors to trade their
shares on an EPM.51 This Note presumes that the economy and society
benefit in the aggregate from start-ups and IPOs and recognizes Silicon
Valley’s outsize presence in that market.52 IPOs are large drivers of

41.
See id. at 12–13.
42.
See Nasdaq Private Market Solutions, supra note 24 (“We help ensure regulatory
compliance in each aspect of the business and operate as a Broker-Dealer, Alternative Trading
System (ATS) and Qualified Matching Service (QMS) as interpreted in a Private Letter Ruling by
the IRS.”).
43.
See 2019 Mid-Year Private Company Report, NASDAQ PRIVATE MARKET 2–3 (July 23,
2019, 2:15 PM) [hereinafter NASDAQ Report], https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/2019-mid-yearprivate-company-report-2019-07-23 [https://perma.cc/L8MV-2PTE].
44.
See id. (explaining that NASDAQ Private Markets alone facilitated $2.3 billion in
exempt securities transactions in the first half of 2019); Nasdaq Private Market Solutions, supra
note 24.
45.
See Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 36–39.
46.
See Nasdaq Private Market Solutions, supra note 24.
47.
See NASDAQ Report, supra note 43, at 3.
48.
Venture Exchanges and Small Cap Companies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec.,
Ins., and Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Affs., 114th Cong. 6–8 (2015)
[hereinafter Venture Exchange Hearings] (statement of Scott Kupor, Managing Partner,
Andreessean and Horowitz).
49.
Id.
50.
See Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 3.
51.
See Fontenay, supra note 1, at 456–57; Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 10, 28.
52.
See Seth C. Oranburg, Democratizing Startups, 68 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1028 (2016);
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 539–40.
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growth in hiring and innovation, while private acquisitions of start-ups
regularly stunt these economic and innovation benefits.53
B. Securities Law: Only One Piece of the Puzzle
The regulatory framework for private securities is vast and
intricate;54 this Note does not attempt to summarize or provide a simple
solution to that body of law. This broad-brush discussion of securities
law coincides with this Note’s focus on providing a new and
technologically enabled solution to the IPO problem.55 The OSP will rely
on the benefits of EPM technology to provide a tax incentive to increase
the number of IPOs in the United States. This respects the status quo
disclosure rules and the significant restrictions that limit the average
investor’s ability to invest in a private company.56 Over the last two
decades, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which brought about expensive
auditing, attestation, and executive liability provisions, has been
blamed for limiting the number of public offerings.57 The OSP does not
take the familiar path of reforming SOX in order to spur IPOs and direct
listings;58 instead, it focuses on increasing investor demand.59
Although certain exceptions exist,60 some created or expanded
by the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act),61 private
securities are most often bought and sold by sophisticated or
institutional investors.62 The OSP fits within the broader policy
53.
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 542.
54.
See Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, Securities
Act Release Nos. 33-10649; 34-86129; IA-5256; IC-33512, 84 Fed. Reg 30460, 30461–68 (June 26,
2019) [hereinafter SEC Concept Release]; see also 15 U.S.C § 77(c) (2020).
55.
See infra Part III.
56.
See Investor Bulletin: Accredited Investors, supra note 3.
57.
See, Paul Rose & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Where Have All the IPOs Gone? The Hard
Life of the Small IPO, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 83, 88–92 (2016).
58.
See id.
59.
See id. at 88–90.
60.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2020); Lora C. Siegler, Annotation Construction and
Application of Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 144 (17 CFR § 230.144) Concerning
Resales of Securities Acquired in Transaction or Series of Transactions Not Involving Public
Offering in Cases Brought Under Federal Securities Laws, 117 A.L.R. Fed. 345 (2020); see also
Michael A. de Freitas, Annotation, Exempted Securities Under § 3(a)(2)–3(a)(8) of Securities Act of
1933 (15 U.S.C.A. § 77c(a)(2)–77c(a)(8)), 119 A.L.R. Fed. 259 (2020).
61.
See Benjamin Hamel, Comment, An Examination of the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act: How Jobs Act Exemptions May Help Startups and Hurt Investors, 17 HOUS.
BUS. & TAX L.J. 59, 64–70 (2016).
62.
See Wallis K. Finger, Note, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s
“Accredited Investor” Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 739–43 (2009);
Christopher R. Zimmerman, Note, Accredited Investors: A Need for Increased Protection in Private
Offerings, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 507, 513–20 (2019).
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landscape that treats EGCs differently than well-established
companies seeking to access the capital markets.63
IPOs and direct listings both bring along public company status,
which generally promotes economic growth64 and provides the average
investor with access to new and emerging companies.65 Although the
OSP does not lie purely within securities law,66 it will address some of
the recent innovations of the JOBS Act and its crowdfunding
regulations in analyzing possible solutions to the IPO problem.67
C. Economic Framework
The decline of the IPO must be viewed in the context of the
golden age of IPOs in the late 1990s.68 At that time, start-up employees
did not need to worry when their shares in a start-up would be cashed
out because venture capital firms had a short investment horizon.69 VCs
were the primary means by which start-ups raised capital and received
strategic advice prior to their IPOs.70 VCs would expect to invest in a
start-up and bring it to the public market during the lifetime of their
VC fund, which averaged seven years.71 Most of these VCs, and by proxy
company IPOs, would have a timeline of three to four years from initial
investment to public exit.72 This short-term horizon often meant that
the general investing public could share in the prosperity and upside
growth potential that awaited at an IPO and the years that followed.73
The bursting of the dot-com bubble, and to a larger extent the
Great Recession, had a significant impact on the current state of the
IPO market.74 All time low interest rates during and after the Great
Recession pushed institutional investors towards VCs and private
investments.75 VCs were able to provide the risk and returns that
63.
See Hamel, supra note 61, at 64–65.
64.
See Oranburg, supra note 52, at 1029–36.
65.
See id.
66.
See infra Part III.
67.
See infra Part III.
68.
Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 11–15.
69.
Id.
70.
See id.; Jason M. Gordon & David Orozco, Trust and Control: The Value Effect of
Venture Capital Term Sheet Provisions as Risk Allocation Tools, 4 MICH.
BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV, 195, 199 (2015).
71.
Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 14.
72.
Id.
73.
See id. at 15–17.
74.
See id. at 12–13.
75.
See Bethany Mclean, Too Big to Fail, COVID-19 Edition: How Private Equity Is
Winning the Coronavirus Crisis, VANITY FAIR (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/
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institutional investors were not receiving in the stock and bond
markets.76 In a reversion from the golden age of the IPO before the
dot-com bubble, the low-rate environment contributed to a glut of VC
capital that allowed start-ups to demand more control over their
companies.77 As a result, founders could pick and choose their investors
and seek money from those more willing to let them keep control, which
in turn allowed companies to remain private longer.78
Congress recognized the lack of IPOs and feared that it could
harm US prosperity, as well as the competitiveness of US capital
markets.79 In reaction, Congress passed the JOBS Act, which is
discussed in more detail in Section II.A.80 Crowdfunding is one of the
solutions that the JOBS Act implemented in order to open access to
exempt securities.81 It was thought to be a way to “democratize”
investing82 and provide start-ups with a more diverse and accessible
funding method.83 Crowdfunding has opened up new investments to the
public, but it has not had the scale or effectiveness in pushing
companies to go public that its boosters expected.84
Emerging company IPOs contribute to healthy capital markets
and robust economic growth.85 Public offerings give investors the
opportunity to support entrepreneurial thinking, and they enable the
general public to share in the economic risks and prosperity of the
world’s newest innovations.86 A public offering can often be a “stepping
stone to achieving scale” and can have extensive positive impacts on
general economic growth and overall employment.87 Between 1980 and
2020/04/how-private-equity-is-winning-the-coronavirus-crisis
[https://perma.cc/JX88-3UC6];
Heather
Somerville,
Startup
Investment
to
Keep
Soaring
After
Record Year, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2019, 2:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/startup-investment-to-keep-soaring-after-record-year-11563561756 [https://perma.cc/93CP-MD4H].
76.
See Maxwell Gawley, Comment, Closing the Carried Interest Loophole and the Impacts
on Venture Capital, 68 DEPAUL L. REV. 671, 684–85 (2019).
77.
Cf. Cristiano Bellavitis & Natalia Matanova, Do Interest Rates Affect VC Fundraising
and Investments?, EUROPEAN FIN. MGMT. ASS’N 16 (Nov. 30, 2017), https://efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2017-Athens/papers/EFMA
2017_0125_fullpaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/MSP6-Q23C].
78.
See id. 24–25.
79.
See Oranburg, supra note 52, at 1029–36.
80.
See id.; infra Section II.A.
81.
See John S. Wroldsen, The Crowdfund Act’s Strange Bedfellows: Democracy and
Start-Up Company Investing, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 357, 362 (2013).
82.
See id. 357–59.
83.
Saunders, supra note 10, at 950–54.
84.
Id. at 958–60.
85.
Fontenay, supra note 1, at 455–56.
86.
See id.
87.
Id.
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2000, there were an average of 310 IPOs annually.88 From 2001 to 2012,
the annual average declined to 99.89 IPOs have seen growth in recent
years—up to 235 in 2019.90 Even with that growth in 2019, markets
debuted 14 percent fewer IPOs in 2019 than they did in 2018.91
Securities market analysts still believe the IPO market is soft.92
The amount of capital that has been raised has only declined slightly,
but this is because large, older firms are going public as opposed to
emerging growth companies.93 Although the number of high-value IPOs
has grown,94 public investors have still been locked out of much of the
growth phase of these newly public companies.95 The public offerings
from these more mature firms do not typically have the same positive
economic and social externalities associated with emerging company
IPOs.96 Accordingly, the trend of delaying IPOs has locked out many
Main Street investors from high-growth companies and their monetary
success.97 Together, the economic and regulatory challenges of the
current IPO landscape provide an opportunity for creative solutions.98
II. ANALYSIS
The public and private capital markets in the United States
have a consistent reputation for regulatory adaptation and reform.99
Many of these adaptations are a result of crises in the securities
markets,100 but some, like the JOBS Act, were tailored to boost an
emerging company’s prospects in the public capital markets.101 This
Part will discuss various proposed solutions to the decline of the IPO
and why these potential solutions are likely to be inadequate. It will
88.
Id. at 455.
89.
Id.
90.
Sara B. Potter, U.S. IPOs Raised More Money in 2019, Despite a Decline in IPO
Volume, FACTSET (Jan. 9, 2020), https://insight.factset.com/u.s.-ipos-raised-more-money-in-2019despite-a-decline-in-ipo-volume [https://perma.cc/NF4K-W3L4].
91.
See id.
92.
JJ Kinahan, IPO Extravaganza Seen Buttressing Banks in Q2, but Soft Trading
Environment Hurts, FORBES (July 15, 2019, 11:03 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jjkinahan/2019/07/15/ipo-extravaganza-seen-buttressing-banks-in-q2-but-soft-trading-environment-hurts/#6d73297b477b [https://perma.cc/4KAW-Q6YV].
93.
Fontenay, supra note 1, at 455.
94.
See Potter, supra note 90.
95.
See McKinsey Staying Private Report, supra note 3.
96.
See Fontenay, supra note 1, at 455–56.
97.
Venture Exchange Hearings, supra note 48, at 7.
98.
See infra Part III.
99.
See Fontenay, supra note 1, at 463–70.
100.
See id. at 464.
101.
See id. at 468–70.
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address the JOBS Act, current regulatory reform proposals,
crowdfunding, and venture exchanges as alternatives to this Note’s
proposed solution of a demand-stimulating tax incentive for public
offerings.102
A. When Good Intentions Backfire: The JOBS Act Reality
The JOBS Act did not encourage listings but instead enabled
firms to remain private longer.103 The JOBS Act increased certain
requirements that allowed companies to delay hitting public company
reporting status.104 It also implemented an IPO on-ramp for EGCs
meant to make the public offering process easier and less expensive.105
Another significant change brought about through the JOBS Act
was a relaxation of the audited financial statement requirements of
SOX.106 Critics of SOX have cited the audit and attestation
requirements as significant barriers to an IPO.107 Now, issuers only
need to provide two years of audited financial statements as opposed to
three, and EGCs are not required to have management attestation of
their internal controls, but beginning with their second annual report
management must assess internal financial controls.108 The JOBS Act
made this major change, in addition to a number of other relaxations of
disclosure requirements, in an effort to reduce the cost of an IPO.109
Despite good intentions, this change has not led to significant
decreases in the cost of an IPO.110 Investors discount the value of a
company that provides fewer corporate and financial disclosures, even
when those disclosures are not required by law.111 Companies like
Twitter decided that although they met the requirements for EGC
status at their IPO, they would comply with the accounting
102.
See infra Part III.
103.
See Fontenay, supra note 1, at 459–66.
104.
See Michael J. Zeidel, The JOBS Act: Did It Accomplish Its Goals?, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 18, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/18/the-jobs-actdid-it-accomplish-its-goals/ [https://perma.cc/7R7L-AW84].
105.
See id.
106.
Roadmap for an IPO: A Guide to Going Public, PWC DEALS 12–13 (Nov. 2017)
[hereinafter Roadmap for an IPO], https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/assets/pwcroadmap-for-an-ipo.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RR9-K2D7].
107.
Bonnie J. Roe, IPO On-Ramp: The Emerging Growth Company, B US. L. TODAY (May
31, 2012), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2012/05/04_roe/
[https://perma.cc/TB4M-7YE6].
108.
Roadmap for an IPO, supra note 106, at 12–13.
109.
Id.
110.
See Brian Howaniec, Comment, The IPO Crisis: Title I of the JOBS Act and Why It
Does Not Go Far Enough, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 845, 874 (2015).
111.
See id. at 872.
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requirements used by non-EGC public companies.112 Furthermore,
many companies that are taking advantage of EGC treatment under
the JOBS Act were likely not the kinds of companies that Congress
intended to benefit.113
In the year following its enactment, the JOBS Act was called an
“utter failure” because it had the immediate effect of depressing public
offerings.114 The JOBS Act’s negative impacts dissipated as companies
realized it did not have as much impact as was initially expected.115
B. A New Regulatory Frontier
The SEC has recognized that, despite the passage of the JOBS
Act in 2012, public offerings have not regained the momentum seen in
the late 1990s and early 2000s.116 SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has
publicly expressed his disappointment concerning the low number of
companies going public early in their lifecycle,117 and the SEC is trying
to promote public issuances while balancing its core mission of capital
formation and investor protection.118 To this end, the staff of the SEC

112.
Todd Blakeley Skelton, 2013 Jobs Act Review & Analysis of Emerging Growth
Company IPOs, 15 TRANSACTIONS 455, 498–99 (2014).
113.
Id. at 496. Special purpose acquisition corporations (SPACs) and mature companies,
such as Manchester United, are using the IPO on-ramp meant for emerging growth companies. Id.
at 496–97. SPACs are publicly traded shell companies that expedite the IPO process for private
equity acquisitions of mature companies. See Usha Rodrigues, SPACS and the JOBS Act, 3 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 18–19 (2012), https://www.hblr.org//?p=2488 [https://perma.cc/TB4M7YE6].
114.
See Zachary M. Seward, The JOBS Act Turns 1—and It’s an Utter Failure, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 5, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/04/the-jobs-act-turns-1-and-itsan-utter-failure/274732/ [https://perma.cc/GH8V-2KKS].
115.
See Therese Poletti, The Government Tried to Encourage IPOs, but It Helped Create
the Age of the Unicorn, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 31, 2017, 2:44 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-government-tried-to-encourage-ipos-but-it-helped-create-the-age-of-theunicorn-2017-12-26; see infra Section II.C.
116.
See Rick A. Fleming, Inv. Advoc., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the NASAA
Public Policy Conference: Enhancing the Demand for IPOs (May 9, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/fleming-enhancing-demand-ipos-050917#_ftn16
[https://perma.cc/66FK-75QL]; SEC Concept Release, supra note 54, at 30460–61, 30465
(displaying a graph showing that the amount of capital raised in registered offerings increased,
but that it was less than that of exempt offerings).
117.
See Michelle Fox, SEC Chair Jay Clayton Wants Big Firms to Go Public Earlier So
Retail Investors Can Get in on the Growth, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/26/sec-chair-jayclayton-wants-big-companies-to-go-public-earlier.html
[https://perma.cc/98V2-8L4V]
(last
updated Apr. 26, 2019 4:23 PM) (“As a general long-term matter, I feel much better that people
are starting to access our capital markets. I do wish that companies were looking to access our
public capital markets earlier in their life cycle.”).
118.
What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html
[https://perma.cc/NFE8-QBRJ] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
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has issued a Concept Release seeking comment from the public on how
to harmonize the private securities exemption regulations.119 This
demonstrates an attempt to make private offerings more efficient and
less legally cumbersome.120 Following a comment period, the SEC
proposed new rules; however, the proposed rules address an issue
distinct from the IPO problem.121 These proposed rules are meant to
address concerns regarding compliance with the myriad of private
marketing offering requirements.122 Many of these exemptions can be
confusing and have overlapping provisions that limit the amount of
capital a company can raise using different exemptions.123 These
proposed rules are meant to address those concerns.124 The recently
proposed rules work to limit contradictions and pitfalls in the private
offering process, but they do not prioritize IPOs and do not address the
role of EPMs in detail.125
C. The Rise of Crowdfunding and Its Shortcomings
Following the Great Recession, crowdfunding was one of the
technological solutions to the slowdown in public offerings and the
changing landscape of start-up investing.126 Crowdfunding has been
touted as part of the solution to the IPO problem.127 Commercial
crowdfunding is a concept where an unfunded project or company raises
money by soliciting small investments from a large number of dispersed
individuals.128 Crowdfunding has a long history and has been
implemented in both commercial and philanthropic endeavors.129 The
internet has accelerated crowdfunding into the mainstream by
intermediating between the entity raising money and investors spread
across the country and around the world.130 Many states have their own
crowdfunding laws, and SEC Regulation 147A grants a safe harbor

119.
See SEC Concept Release, supra note 54, at 30460–61.
120.
See id.
121.
See Facilitating Capital Formation and Expanding Investment Opportunities by
Improving Access to Capital in Private Markets, 85 Fed. Reg. 17956, 17957–58 (proposed Mar. 31,
2020) [hereinafter SEC Proposed Rules].
122.
See id. at 17957–59.
123.
See id. at 17964–66.
124.
See id. at 17964–67.
125.
See id. at 17958; SEC Concept Release, supra note 54, at 30460–65.
126.
BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 9, at 42–44.
127.
See Oranburg, supra note 52, at 1014–17.
128.
Cf. Saunders, supra note 10, at 946–47.
129.
Cf. id. at 946–50.
130.
Cf. id. at 948–49.
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from the federal securities laws for intrastate crowdfunding even if the
issuer performs the offering over the internet.131
1. The Inadequacies of Crowdfunding
Born out of the JOBS Act, Regulation Crowdfunding, proposed
and implemented by the SEC, is a system that allows issuers to sell
their securities in limited amounts to the general public on a nationwide
basis through regulated crowdfunding intermediaries.132 These are
securities that in all likelihood would only be available to accredited
and institutional investors under any other circumstances.133 This new
system, which is in addition to state crowdfunding laws, has its
requirements and limitations.134 Regulation Crowdfunding sets the
maximum offering amount for national crowdfunding by issuers ($1.07
million in a twelve-month period), limits the amount individuals can
invest,135 and creates a framework that regulates intermediaries that
facilitate crowdfunding.136 Regulation Crowdfunding also has filing and
disclosure requirements.137 It requires information on an issuer’s
officers, directors, and beneficial owners, as well as the issuer’s
financial condition.138 The intermediary platforms must be
SEC-registered broker-dealers or registered funding portals.139
Regulation Crowdfunding created registered funding portals as
intermediaries for crowdfunding transactions that fall within a safe
harbor for broker-dealer registration.140 As a result, crowdfunding
intermediaries can facilitate crowdfunding offerings but cannot solicit
131.
See Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, Securities
Act Release. No. 33-10238, Exchange Act Release No. 34-79161, 81 Fed. Reg. 83494, 83495, 83494
(Nov. 21, 2016).
132.
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE COMMISSION: REGULATION
CROWDFUNDING
3,
6
(2019)
[hereinafter
SEC
CROWDFUNDING
REPORT],
https://www.sec.gov/files/regulation-crowdfunding-2019_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XTR8-PKC6].
133.
Cf. 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.100(a), 230.501 (2020).
134.
See SEC Concept Release, supra note 54, at 30499–504.
135.
See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a). “Limits on how much each investor may invest over the
course of a 12-month period in the aggregate across all crowdfunding offerings depend on the
investor’s annual income or net worth. If either the investor’s annual income or net worth is less
than $107,000, the limit equals the greater of $2,200 or five percent of the lesser of the annual
income or net worth. If both the investor’s annual income and net worth are at least $107,000,
then the limit equals ten percent of the lesser of the annual income or net worth, up to a maximum
of $107,000.” SEC CROWDFUNDING REPORT, supra note 132, at 6–7.
136.
SEC CROWDFUNDING REPORT, supra note 132, at 6.
137.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.201, 227.203 (2020).
138.
See id.
139.
SEC CROWDFUNDING REPORT, supra note 132, at 10.
140.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.400–402 (2020); SEC CROWDFUNDING REPORT, supra note 132,
at 10.
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offers, give investment advice or recommendations, or compensate
promoters or others for soliciting the securities they list.141
Opening access to crowdfunding democratizes investing in
start-ups,142 but it does not go far enough in making a significant impact
on the trajectory of the IPO market.143 Crowdfunding’s small scale
shows that it is likely not providing the general investing public with
the opportunity to participate in the emerging company growth
experienced in prior decades.144 In 2017, US businesses raised about
$35 million in all forms of crowdfunding, whereas companies raised in
total over $2.4 trillion in private markets.145 Companies raised around
$1.8 trillion of that total through traditional private placements to
mainly accredited and institutional investors under the Regulation D
exemptions to the federal securities laws.146 Even with the recently
proposed SEC rules meant to relax the investor limits and raise the
threshold for how much issuers can raise,147 crowdfunding is still likely
not a viable alternative to the traditional private markets or a solution
to the IPO problem.
Crowdfunding faces a systemic contradiction in its attempt to
both democratize investing and stimulate public offerings.148 It is
supposed to give retail investors access to new and high-growth
investment opportunities and stimulate IPOs, but, in reality, it grants
access to unaccredited investors without providing those unaccredited
investors with adequate information or professional guidance.149
Crowdfunding evangelists did not foresee that the new structure of
these platforms would prevent investors from getting the kind of
information they needed to take the risk of entering the crowdfunding
space.150 A crowdfunding company’s digital portal oftentimes cannot
advise on the status of the market or provide information to investors
outside of the bare-bones disclosures that crowdfunding issuers are

141.
See 17 C.F.R. § 227.402.
142.
See Oranburg, supra note 52, at 1030–31; Saunders, supra note 10, at 947.
143.
See Fontenay, supra note 1, at 469.
144.
See Jean Eaglesham & Coulter Jones, The Fuel Powering Corporate America: $2.4
Trillion in Private Fundraising, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stock-and-bond-markets-dethroned-private-fundraising-is-now-dominant-1522683249
[https://perma.cc/UUL7-6RYG].
145.
Id.
146.
BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 9, at 1–4 (2018).
147.
SEC Proposed Rules, supra note 121, at 17993–94.
148.
See David Groshoff, Equity Crowdfunding as Economic Development?, 38 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 317, 332 (2016); Wroldsen, supra note 81, at 393.
149.
See Groshoff, supra note 148, at 332–33; Wroldsen, supra note 81, at 382.
150.
See Wroldsen, supra note 81, at 380–86.
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required to publish.151 Some of the securities law literature has argued
that the “wisdom of the crowd”152 will substitute for analysis and
brokerage advice.153 If that is the case, it has not adequately encouraged
investment in crowdfunding, which can be seen by crowdfunding’s
disappointing volume.154
In reality, retail investors do not have access to the information
that could be acquired from a broker or analyst.155 Unlike
broker-executed transactions for exempt securities, crowdfunding
platforms cannot advise on any aspect of the securities issued.156 A
broker can oftentimes provide market information or point investors
towards analysts who follow the industry.157 For public companies,
much of the analysis and advice surrounding the viability of an issuance
is in the public domain.158 This information asymmetry is one of the
main reasons that crowdfunding, despite its digital advantage and
democratic targeting, has played a negligible role in increasing private
company access to the public markets.159
When the JOBS Act legitimized crowdfunding at the federal
level, it was in some ways a direct response to the IPO problem.160
Scholarly observers and market participants saw crowdfunding as a
way to grant the public access to the high-growth companies found in
private markets,161 but crowdfunding activity has been limited in
comparison to traditional private markets.162 Crowdfunding pales in
comparison to the number of securities that are handled by NASDAQ

151.
See id.
152.
See Saunders, supra note 10, at 964–65. The “wisdom of the crowd” is the idea that
when a crowdfunding campaign draws a large number of potential investors, the aggregate
information gathering power of those individuals is able to weed out potentially unsuitable
investments. See id.
153.
See Wroldsen, supra note 81, at 382–83.
154.
See Eaglesham & Jones, supra note 144; Katia Moskvitch & Richard Priday, After
High-Profile Failures, Can We Still Believe Crowdfunding Hype?, WIRED U.K. (June 12, 2018),
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/crowdfunding-risks-sugru-ossic [https://perma.cc/6M3S-AN3A].
155.
See Wroldsen, supra note 81, at 380–82.
156.
See id. at 382–85.
157.
Saunders, supra note 10, at 957.
158.
See Wroldsen, supra note 81, at 380–86.
159.
Saunders, supra note 10, at 962–63 (explaining that because crowdfunded offerings
are small, they fail to attract professional brokerage analysis, which has suppressed
crowdfunding’s effectiveness); see Wroldsen, supra note 81, at 380–82; cf. Fontenay, supra note 1,
at 468–70 (alluding to how even the implementation of crowdfunding has most likely hurt the US
IPO market more than it has helped it).
160.
Saunders, supra note 10, at 950–53.
161.
Id.
162.
See Eaglesham & Jones, supra note 144.
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Private Market alone.163 Unfortunately, despite crowdfunding’s
ambitious aspirations, in many ways it has not lived up to its hype. On
its own, crowdfunding is not a viable solution to the IPO problem.164
D. Venture Exchanges: A Solution Disconnected from the Problem
The launch of the United States’ first venture exchange, the
Long-Term Stock Exchange, has been another attempt to spur IPOs and
public offerings.165 This exchange was recently approved for national
exchange status by the SEC.166 A venture exchange is meant to be an
alternative forum for IPOs and direct listings of emerging company
stock.167 Unlike an EPM, shares issued or traded on a venture exchange
are publicly traded and must meet the registration requirements of the
SEC.168 A venture exchange is not a forum to issue or trade exempted
securities.169 Venture exchanges are meant to compete with the New
York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ for public offerings of emerging
technology companies.170 Other than providing a national exchange
platform run by venture capitalists and technology executives,171 infant
venture exchanges do not provide incentives to investors to increase
demand for IPOs and are not as well tested or used as EPMs.172 Venture
exchanges have been referred to as “a solution in search of a
problem.”173 Once they are active, venture exchanges might be able to

163.
See NASDAQ Private Market Sets New Transaction Record in the First Half of 2019,
GLOBENEWSWIRE (July 23, 2019, 10:05 AM), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/07/23/1886533/0/en/Nasdaq-Private-Market-Sets-New-Transaction-Record-in-theFirst-Half-of-2019.html [https://perma.cc/27YV-VQRW] (stating that NASDAQ Private Market
facilitated over $3 billion in transactions on its platform in the first half of 2019).
164.
See Moskvitch & Priday, supra note 154.
165.
Venture Exchange Hearings, supra note 48, at 4–8 (statement of Stephen Luparello,
Director, Division of Trading and Markets, Securities and Exchange Commission) (statement of
Scott Kupor, Managing Partner, Andreessean and Horowitz); see In the Matter of the Application
of Long Term Stock Exchange, Inc.; for Registration as a National Securities Exchange; Findings,
Opinion, and Order of the Commission, 84 Fed. Reg. 21841, 21853 (May 10, 2019), [hereinafter
Venture Exchange Registration].
166.
Venture Exchange Registration, supra note 165, at 21853.
167.
See Venture Exchange Hearings, supra note 48, at 6–7.
168.
See Venture Exchange Registration, supra note 165, at 21850–51.
169.
See id.
170.
See id.
171.
See Venture Exchange Hearings, supra note 48, at 6–8.
172.
See id. at 8–13 (statement of Nelson Griggs, Executive Vice President, Listing
Services, Nasdaq OMX Group).
173.
See id. at 13 (statement of Sen. Mark R. Warner).
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encourage emerging companies to go public, but this Note looks to
provide a more substantial and potentially disruptive solution.174
Venture exchanges are new and untested.175 Unlike EPMs,176
venture exchanges are not directly backed by brokerage or exchange
firms with the knowledge and experience to facilitate trading.177 They
are staffed with former employees of exchanges, but the exchange’s
birthplace is in the minds of venture capitalists, not brokers or
market-makers.178 The most successful EPMs are managed as
subsidiaries of national exchanges that have significant brokerage and
market-making experience.179 This expertise differs significantly from
that of traditional VCs.180 VCs usually earn fees from investments in
direct proportion to their fund’s returns and assets under
management.181 EPMs derive their revenue from advisory services.182
They also generate revenue by facilitating difficult-to-price and illiquid
transactions; EPMs earn a spread or discount on each transaction.183
The EPM’s expertise advantage over venture exchanges184 provides a
compelling reason to focus regulatory reform efforts and incentives
towards EPMs over untested venture exchanges.

174.
See infra Part III.
175.
See Venture Exchange Hearings, supra note 48, at 1 (statement of Sen. Mike Crapo).
176.
See Nasdaq Private Market Solutions, supra note 24.
177.
See Team, LONG-TERM STOCK EXCH., https://ltse.com/team/ [https://perma.cc/Q6EPHDY7] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
178.
See Venture Exchange Hearings, supra note 48, at 6–8; Team, supra note 177.
179.
See Nasdaq Private Market Solutions, supra note 24; Frequently Asked Questions,
SHARESPOST FIN. CORP., https://sharespost.com/about/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/R5K5-K5PT] (last
visited Oct. 3, 2020).
180.
See Kate Litvak, The Going-Private Phenomenon: Venture Capital Limited
Partnership Agreements: Understanding Compensation Arrangements, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 161,
161–62 (2009) (providing a comprehensive study of venture capital asset management
compensation arrangements).
181.
See id. at 161.
182.
See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 179.
183.
Selling Your Startup Shares: Comparison of Secondary Stock Marketplaces, HARNESS
WEALTH (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.harnesswealth.com/articles/selling-your-startup-sharescomparison-secondary-stock-marketplaces/ [https://perma.cc/YPR4-2H2M] (explaining that
SharesPost’s fees for facilitating transactions are 5 percent of the closing price from the seller in
transactions over $100,000 and a $5,000 flat fee for transactions below that threshold). There is
no publicly available information on how NASDAQ Private Market prices its transactions, but
since SharesPost and NASDAQ are the two market leaders, pricing is likely to be competitive
between the two. See id. Also, neither company illustrates how it collects fees in advisory and
market-making within the private markets which is likely a lucrative business given liquidity
issues and information asymmetries. See id.
184.
Cf. Nasdaq Private Market Solutions, supra note 24; Further Disclosures, SHARESPOST
FIN. CORP., https://sharespost.com/further-disclosures/ [https://perma.cc/R5K5-K5PT] (last visited
Oct. 3, 2020).
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As opposed to certain EPMs like NASDAQ,185 venture exchanges
have no track record of accurate pricing.186 NASDAQ Private Market
and its competitors have fairly long track records of accurately pricing
securities and matching buyers with sellers.187 Were venture exchanges
to be subsidized or given a regulatory advantage over EPMs, the
regulators would favor a less proven concept with no current track
record of success.188
Many also complain that venture exchanges are designed to
retain founder control, even after an IPO.189 This control is maintained
through dual-class equity structures that provide founders with stock
that possesses supermajority voting power190 while shares with
one-to-one voting power are sold to the public.191 Stock exchanges, such
as the New York Stock Exchange, restrict companies from having
outstanding dual-class voting shares unless they existed prior to their
IPO.192 In addition, the Standard & Poor’s 500 index has prospectively
banned any company from its index that has a dual-class equity
structure.193 Institutional investors have voiced their concerns that the
Long-Term Stock Exchange’s goal is not really to support emerging
companies, but rather to protect the founders’ and VC’s managerial
interests.194 This lack of shareholder control is a significant concern for
institutional investors.195

185.
See Nasdaq Private Market Solutions, supra note 24.
186.
See Kevin J. Delaney, A Group from Silicon Valley Has a Serious Plan for Creating a
Totally New US Stock Exchange, QUARTZ (June 13, 2016), https://qz.com/704657/eric-ries-ltselong-term-stock-exchange/ [https://perma.cc/Y3UE-MXSZ] (explaining the features of the
Long-Term Stock Exchange that make it the first of its kind).
187.
See NASDAQ Report, supra note 43; Further Disclosures, supra note 184.
188.
See Venture Exchange Registration, supra note 165, at 21849.
189.
See Letter from Jeffrey P. Mahoney, Gen. Couns., Council of Institutional Invs., to
Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 22, 2019) [hereinafter CII Letter],
https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2019/20190109%20SEC%20Letter
%20LTSE%20Application.pdf [https://perma.cc/QH7T-9WBA] (illustrating the position of
long-term asset managers on the issues that may arise from tiered voting shares in general and
on the Long-Term Stock Exchange in particular).
190.
See id.
191.
See id.
192.
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL RULE 313.10, N.Y. STOCK EXCH., https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listed-company-manual/document?treeNodeId=csh-da-filter!WKUS-TALDOCS-PHC-%7B0588BF4A-D3B5-4B91-94EA-BE9F17057DF0%7D—WKUS_TAL_5667%23teid100 [https://perma.cc/W8Q4-5RW2] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
193.
See Trevor Hunnicutt, S&P 500 To Exclude Snap After Voting Rights Debate, REUTERS
(July 31, 2017, 8:44 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-snap-s-p-idUSKBN1AH2RV
[https://perma.cc/L846-UWBN].
194.
See CII Letter, supra note 189.
195.
See id.
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Venture exchanges, including the Long-Term Stock Exchange,
leave regulatory hurdles in place.196 They may provide a unique trading
platform for newly listed companies, but venture exchanges are still
national exchanges under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.197
Therefore, they do not reduce the burden of registering offerings with
the SEC or the disclosure requirements of public company status.198 If
companies are waiting to go public due to regulatory expenses, having
a new place to list will likely not put pressure on managers and major
shareholders to push for an IPO. The OSP would encourage public
offerings rather than simply provide a new landing zone for registered
securities.199
III. SOLUTION: AN OPPORTUNITY ZONE FOR PUBLIC LISTINGS
This Part will propose the OSP, an opportunity zone for private
company securities, in order to encourage more companies to go public
and shorten the length of time before companies undergo an IPO. First
is an explanation of the background motivations for the Program and a
discussion of its legal inspiration, the opportunity zone fund, and its
proposed statutory basis. Following this discussion, the mechanics of
the OSP are distinguished from the extensive shortcomings of the
opportunity zone fund program. Section III.A then discusses the
parameters of the OSP, specifically its mechanics, requirements, and
restrictions. Finally, Sections III.D and III.E of this Note analyze the
OSP’s unique positive attributes, shortcomings, and challenges.
In its basic form, the OSP will encourage private investors to buy
start-up opportunity securities before an IPO and encourage public
investors to purchase shares after an IPO. If the issuer and purchaser
follow specific requirements, including trading on an EPM, then the
capital gains tax on the sale of those securities can be deferred, and the
value rolled into another private or public investment within the OSP.
A. Background
Most solutions to the problem of declining IPOs focus on the
front and middle of an emerging company’s timeline by reducing the
regulatory burden. Although the SEC has formerly mentioned lowering
capital gains tax rates on IPO shares with certain holding periods, that
solution was buried in a research report from 2011 with no detailed
196.
197.
198.
199.

Venture Exchange Registration, supra note 165, at 21850.
See id. at 21853.
See id.
See infra Part III.
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implementation plan.200 This Section builds on the SEC’s proposal and
provides significant improvements and modifications to make any
future proposal more effective and sustainable.201 The OSP would focus
on the middle to back end of the private company timeline by
stimulating demand for securities. It would only be available if the
company becomes publicly traded in a sustainable manner within a
specified timeframe.
This solution borrows some ideas from the 2017 Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act’s Opportunity Zone Program. The OSP differs significantly in
both substance and implementation. The proposed OSP would be far
narrower and better tailored in order to reduce perverse incentives
present in the Opportunity Zone Program.202 The traditional
Opportunity Zone Program allowed investors to sell appreciated assets,
invest the proceeds, and simultaneously defer capital gains taxes.203
Investors are allowed to purchase stock and partnership interests in
businesses within the opportunity zone, but those purchases have been
rare; instead, these funds have focused on real estate investment and
development.204
The solution proposed will differ significantly from the
Opportunity Zone Program because it is working to solve a different
problem,205 and it will be tailored to the unique structure of the market
for emerging company stock.206 One significant difference between the
OSP and the Opportunity Zone Program is that, unlike in opportunity
zones, opportunity securities can only be purchased with cash or with
the sale and rollover of deferred capital gains from previous opportunity
securities.207 This restriction will limit the downsides that have
materialized with opportunity funds that predominately serve as tax
shelters for wealthy investors.208

200.
REBUILDING THE IPO, supra note 17, at 30.
201.
See infra Section III.D.
202.
See Michael Hirschfeld & Philip R. Hirschfeld, Qualified Opportunity Zone Funds a
Tax Investment Worth Considering, 33 PROB. & PROP. 12, 12–14 (2019) (providing an overview of
the tax deferral program implemented by the 2017 tax reform law that allows tax deferral of
capital gains on the sale of any kind of appreciated investment asset so long as it is reinvested in
a qualified opportunity fund); Jesse Drucker & Eric Lipton, How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor
Communities Became a Windfall for the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/business/tax-opportunity-zones.html?auth=login-email&login=email
[https://perma.cc/7FZQ-H5W4] (last updated Sept. 27, 2020).
203.
See Hirschfeld & Hirschfeld, supra note 202, at 12.
204.
See id.
205.
See Drucker & Lipton, supra note 202.
206.
See supra Part II.
207.
See Drucker & Lipton, supra note 202.
208.
Id.
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EPMs are the fundamental component of the OSP because they
provide unique capabilities and will hopefully be realigned and
incentivized to encourage public offerings. The requirement that OSP
securities trade on an EPM harnesses the technology and expertise of
EPM platforms and their participants. EPMs ensure there is adequate
interest in the security and that there is an active and liquid market.
An EPM intermediary that ensures adequate interest and liquidity in
the underlying securities provides benefits to both issuers and
purchasers. Issuers will be able to raise money faster and cash out key
employees, whereas purchasers following the IPO or direct listing in the
public markets will be able to purchase a security that has had its
attractiveness and business plan tested by the private markets.
The OSP will also benefit accredited investors and others who
can purchase exempt securities because it means that more securities
will trade on EPMs, thus contributing to price discovery in a market
that is less liquid than a national exchange. Additionally, private
investors will inherently encourage public offerings. When private
investors actively trade on an EPM they will ensure that a company’s
securities will qualify for the OSP.
B. Statutory Basis
Under I.R.C. § 1031(a), the Internal Revenue Code allows the
deferral of gain on real property that would result from a sale so long
as a like-kind exchange occurs within a statutory period.209 This allows
taxpayers to effectively roll their capital gains into the new property
and immediately take advantage of their gain’s additional buying
power.210 The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act limited § 1031 to real
property.211 Prior to 2017, personal and other kinds of property used in
a trade or business or for investment could defer capital gains through
a like-kind exchange.212 Stocks, bonds, and other securities have always
been explicitly excluded from taking advantage of this kind of tax

209.
26 U.S.C. § 1031(a) (2020).
210.
Bradley T. Borden, Safe Harbors and Careful Planning Make Deferred Exchanges a
Valuable Tool, 25 J. TAX’N INVS. 43 (2008) (providing an overview of deferred exchanges in the
context of real property transactions).
211.
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13303(a) 131 Stat. 2123
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1031 (2018)) [hereinafter 2017 Tax Reform
Law] (amending § 1031(a)(1) by striking “property” each place it appears and inserting “real
property”).
212.
47A C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 122 (2020).
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treatment, except in rare and economically inconsequential
circumstances.213
The OSP would apply § 1031 to private market shares that are
trading on an EPM in very specific circumstances in order to encourage
IPOs and direct listings of exempt securities. The method of this
solution is to rely on the technological advantage that EPMs provide.
These private markets are run by reputable broker-dealers that
are registered and regulated by the SEC.214 The mere fact that shares
are allowed to trade on these exchanges means that financial
professionals at these firms likely have exposure to the intricacies of
the business beyond an ordinary private market investor.215 By using
this additional layer of vetting facilitated by technological
advancement, the tax code can be used to subsidize the investors in
these companies should the company be listed on a large exchange in
the future.216 The fundamental differences between the OSP and the
current Opportunity Fund Program are the key to ensuring that this
solution works properly without the adverse impacts of the Opportunity
Fund Program.217
C. The Opportunity Securities Program: Mechanics
In order for a purchase or issuance of securities to qualify as an
opportunity security that receives like-kind treatment, the purchase or
issuance will have to meet certain requirements. The conditions
discussed below are meant to limit negative externalities and tailor the
impact of this proposal. Additionally, these restrictions fundamentally
differentiate the OSP from the Opportunity Fund Program in scope,
implementation, and purpose.218
EPM requirements establish how the securities will need to be
traded on an EPM platform to qualify for “opportunity status.”219
213.
26 U.S.C. § 1036(a) (2020) (“[N]o gain or loss shall be recognized if common stock in a
corporation is exchanged solely for common stock in the same corporation.”).
214.
See Nasdaq Private Market Solutions, supra note 24; Frequently Asked Questions,
supra note 179; Eaglesham & Jones, supra note 144.
215.
See Nasdaq Private Market Solutions, supra note 24.
216.
See id.
217.
Unlike the opportunity funding program there will be no “opportunity zones” selected
by lobbyists and regulators. See Drucker & Lipton, supra note 202. Therefore, companies will not
be able to lobby to be included in the program since it will apply to all private companies that trade
on an EPM. See id. Additionally, investors will not be able to invest the value of appreciated assets
unless those assets were opportunity securities. See id. This limitation will discourage tax
sheltering and tailors the subsidizing nature of this program. See id.
218.
See Drucker & Lipton, supra note 202.
219.
See infra Section III.C.1.
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Listing requirements delineate the kinds of securities that qualify and
where securities will have to trade once they are publicly listed.220
Purchaser requirements, on the other hand, describe the obligations of
a buyer of securities in ensuring they take the necessary steps to have
their transactions qualify for tax deferral.221 To make this incentive
program effective, only common stock, preferred stock, and convertible
debt will qualify for opportunity treatment because they are the
primary securities that feed into an IPO and the means by which
start-ups raise capital privately and publicly.222 Opportunity security
status for convertible debt will not apply to convertible debt
instruments themselves.223 Instead, the program will apply to the
securities received as a result of the conversion of that debt instrument,
so long as the securities received during the conversion contain the
same economic and governance rights as common shares or preferred
shares. The following requirements will work together to create an
effective and consistent system to bring about positive and
technologically driven change in the securities markets.
1. Issuer Requirements
An issuer wishing to qualify for OSP status must maintain its
securities on an EPM, most likely either SharesPost or NASDAQ
Private Market.224 The securities will have to trade on an EPM for

220.
See infra Section III.C.1.
221.
See infra Section III.C.2.
222.
See Scott Edward Walker, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Convertible
Note
Seed
Financings
(But
Were
Afraid
to
Ask),
TECH
CRUNCH,
https://techcrunch.com/2012/04/07/convertible-note-seed-financings/
[https://perma.cc/UG4UJEFS] (last updated Apr. 7, 2012 4:42 PM).
223.
A convertible debt instrument is a contract for debt that allows the creditor to convert
their debt investment into equity of the issuer upon a conversion event. Id. A conversion event is
a specified contractual circumstance embedded in the instrument that will trigger the conversion.
Id.
224.
See Nasdaq Private Market Solutions, supra note 24; Further Disclosures, supra note
184. As of now SharesPost has a very similar business model and platform as NPM. See Nasdaq
Private Market Solutions, supra note 24; Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 179. That being
said, SharesPost started out as an auction board for private securities, where buyers and sellers
would list prices and share quantities and the platform would match orders. Vanessa
Schoenthaler, SharesPost: The Evolution of a Broker-Dealer, 100 F ST. (Mar. 5, 2012),
http://100fstreet.com/index.php/2012/03/sharespost-the-evolution-of-a-broker-dealer/#:~:text
=SharesPost%20started%20out%20in%20June,and%20execute%20their%20own%20transactions.&text=Their%20role%20was%20to%20facilitate%20transactions%20between%20buyers%20and%20sellers [https://perma.cc/K7EH-8XLG]. Although this matching service is at the
core of SharesPost’s platform, it now provides advisory and brokerage services similar to NPM in
order to facilitate larger scale aggregated transactions, such as private offerings and employee
cash-outs. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 179.
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longer than twelve but less than thirty-six months. During that time,
the security will have to trade with a certain level of liquidity, measured
on a sliding scale based on market capitalization, in order to
demonstrate investor sentiment and future potential.225 This
requirement is necessary for three reasons. First, it encapsulates all of
the benefits of EPMs that have driven companies away from public
markets. Second, it ensures liquidity prior to a public listing. Third, it
provides a timeline for an offering by ensuring that companies are not
forced to go public too early but also that they do not wait too long to go
public and fail to accomplish the goal of increasing public offerings.
The twelve-month minimum will be purposefully inflexible to
ensure that companies are using the EPM platform as a way to test the
waters and solidify investor sentiment and liquidity rather than as a
tax shelter. The maximum will be flexible for smaller companies below
certain market capitalizations. These twelve-month waivers will be
renewable once and, thus, provide twelve to twenty-four months beyond
the standard timeline. To qualify for a waiver, the issuer will have to
submit an IPO plan to the EPM. The waivers will require the approval
of the EPM with the highest volume of transactions in that particular
security.
To qualify as an opportunity security, the issuer’s securities
must undergo an initial or direct listing on the NASDAQ, the NYSE, a
liquid over-the-counter market,226 or a foreign equivalent of any of the
above. Alternatively, the company may become a reporting entity under
the Exchange Act of 1934 or a foreign equivalent, which will facilitate
public access to its securities.227 These two liquidity events underlie the
225.
For example, a company with less than $500 million in market capitalization may be
eligible for a two-year waiver and a company with a $3 billion market capitalization could apply
for a one-year waiver.
226.
An over-the-counter market is a market for securities that are publicly traded, but are
not listed on a national exchange, such as NASDAQ. See Randall Dodd, Markets: Exchange or
Over-the-Counter, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/markets.htm [https://perma.cc/U45A-J673] (last updated Feb. 24, 2020). These securities are traded
by brokers on behalf of clients without exchange intermediaries, but the securities must still be
registered with the SEC. See id. Many smaller start-ups and early public companies that do not
have the market capitalization to trade on a larger exchange trade over the counter and are
disadvantaged. See id.
227.
Exchange Act Reporting and Registration, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/exchangeactreporting
[https://perma.cc/W6QY2QBJ] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020) (“Even if your company does not have an effective registration
statement for a public offering, it could still be required to file a registration statement and become
a reporting company under Section 12 of the Exchange Act if: it has more than $10 million in total
assets and a class of equity securities, like common stock, that is held of record by either (1) 2,000
or more persons or (2) 500 or more persons who are not accredited investors or it lists the securities
on a U.S. exchange.”). Public company status allows unaccredited investors unlimited access to an
investing opportunity. See id.
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entire prospect of resolving the IPO problem. In order for any solution
to ensure greater access to these investment opportunities, the
securities must become available to public investors in a reasonable
amount of time.
2. Purchaser Requirements
To make a qualifying purchase, an investor must buy a security
that has been designated an opportunity security. These securities will
either be purchased on an EPM or within one year of a public offering.
Purchasing the securities in the private market on an EPM exposes the
investor to the risk that the company will never list or will not list in
the timeframe required to receive opportunity security status. If that
possibility becomes reality, the securities will no longer qualify for tax
deferral.228 For public market participants, opportunity securities will
be those securities purchased within one year of a public listing that
had previously traded on an EPM and that satisfy all other opportunity
security requirements.
In order to sell an opportunity security and receive tax deferral,
an investor must comply with the following requirements. The
purchaser in either the public or private markets must have held the
security for at least one year while the security was publicly traded.
Then, within six months for private market purchasers and within one
year for public market purchasers, the investor must purchase new
opportunity securities from a different issuer or a different class of
securities from the previous issuer to receive tax deferral. Those
opportunity securities can either be private securities already
designated as opportunity securities, or they can be securities that have
been publicly listed within the last twelve months.
3. Restrictions
In order to ensure that the program captures the appropriate
benefits and incentives, the program requires certain restrictions. For
example, an investor will only be allowed to purchase opportunity
securities with cash or with the qualified rollover of funds from the sale
of securities that were previously part of the OSP.229 One of the most

228.
See supra Section III.C.1.
229.
This is in direct opposition to the problems of the Opportunity Zone Fund Program.
See Drucker & Lipton, supra note 202; see also Opportunity Zones Frequently Asked Questions,
U.S.
INTERNAL
REVENUE
SERV.
[hereinafter
IRS
Opportunity
Zone
FAQ],
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/opportunity-zones-frequently-asked-questions#general
[https://perma.cc/H8AQ-ZKWB] (last visited Oct. 3, 2020).
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controversial aspects of the current opportunity fund program is that it
allows an investor to roll over already appreciated assets into an
opportunity fund to further defer taxes and diversify the investor’s
portfolio.230 Critics, with significant credibility, have portrayed the
traditional Opportunity Zone Program as a tax haven for wealthy
investors.231 In order to limit that negative externality and encourage
the widespread benefit of this program, opportunity securities will
avoid this problem entirely. Legal compliance will be facilitated in the
same way that brokerage firms provide segregated retirement
accounts232 or how § 1031 qualified intermediaries hold funds in trust
to ensure compliance with the like-kind qualifications.233 Although it
will not be without administrative compliance costs, the OSP will not
add additional costs beyond the general compliance regime that will be
necessary to ensure the program is implemented properly.
Beyond these mandatory restrictions, there are two additional
restrictions that, while not essential to the fundamental functioning of
the program, policy makers should consider implementing in the future.
First, the program could preclude founders from participating. This has
the benefit of encouraging founders to divest control of their company
into public hands because they would likely sell more shares in order to
have a greater demand boost from the tax subsidy in a public offering.
Additionally, precluding founders would limit over-subsidization.
Company founders in the United States are essentially able to convert
labor income into capital income taxed at a preferential rate through
entrepreneurship.234 The OSP would be another incentive on top of that
tax benefit that may not provide a marginal benefit to society. On the
other hand, allowing founder participation may encourage serial
entrepreneurship by providing streams of capital for future
reinvestment on a tax-deferred basis, thus benefiting society and the
economy. A similar debate arises when looking to apply an early bound
restriction on securities that would have to be purchased by private
market participants.235 This might encourage capital investment from

230.
See Drucker & Lipton, supra note 202.
231.
See id.
232.
See Retirement Offerings, TD AMERITRADE, https://www.tdameritrade.com/retirement-planning/retirement-suite.page [https://perma.cc/L97H-YUPD] (last visited Oct. 4, 2020).
233.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1 (2020).
234.
See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Taxing Founders’ Stock, 59 UCLA L. REV. 60, 62–63 (2011)
(describing the well-known phenomenon that founders are often compensated with equity in their
enterprise instead of or in substitution for part of their labor income, which has the effect of
converting labor income into capital income for income tax purposes).
235.
See supra Section III.C.2.
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mid-to-late-stage investors, but it may discourage VCs from providing
issuers with their capital and expertise early on.
D. Challenges, Costs, and Shortcomings
Although the OSP would make significant and beneficial
changes to the securities markets, it will likely face a number of
challenges. The political, economic, and administrability challenges of
this solution are not insignificant. The OSP would require the rare
cooperation of the executive and legislative branches alongside private
sector collaboration. The status quo has harmed investors and prior
solutions have been inadequate, so cooperation between the political
branches could become more realistic in the near future. The benefits
of the OSP would outweigh its shortcomings, as well as the
shortcomings realized by previously implemented solutions.
1. Political Shortcomings
The largest political impediment to the OSP is that it requires
congressional legislation.236 As of 2017, Congress scaled back the tax
deferral of § 1031 by removing deferral for like-kind exchanges of
tangible property used in a trade or business or held for investment
purposes.237 Section 1031 now only provides deferral for real
property.238 A presidential administration could attempt to undertake
this endeavor through administrative rulemaking. Given that Congress
has played an essential role in shaping § 1031,239 there are likely no
areas of discretion for the executive branch to unilaterally implement
the OSP.
Although both Democratic and Republican administrations have
pushed to ease the burden of public company status for smaller
companies, recent administrations have favored a deregulatory
approach.240 Providing this tax deferral could easily cost billions of

236.
Congress limited like-kind exchanges in 2017, which is not encouraging for further
expansion of this provision to opportunity securities. 2017 Tax Reform Law, supra note 211, Stat.
2054, 2123. But see id. at § 1400Z-2(a) 131 Stat. 2054, 2184 1400Z-2 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 1400Z-2) (describing the capital gains incentives built into the Opportunity Fund
Program).
237.
2017 Tax Reform Law, supra note 211, Stat. 2123.
238.
Id.
239.
See Zeidel, supra note 104.
240.
See Frank Partnoy, The Death of the IPO, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/private-inequity/570808/
[https://perma.cc/CT2V-FSV6];
Oranburg, supra note 52, at 1018–19; Saunders, supra note 10, at 952–53.
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dollars.241 Despite these costs, there are technological externalities that
result from start-ups that are not easily quantified in economic growth
figures and tax expenditures. If this program creates the funding
necessary to bring about the creation of the next Google or
Genentech,242 society may be better off despite the fiscal costs.
2. Administrative and Economic Challenges
The OSP will likely face a shell company problem.
Entrepreneurial tax dodgers could be tempted to create shell
corporations traded on EPMs with no economic activity in an attempt
to provide a tax deferral mechanism with no economic substance. Since
EPMs are broker-dealers regulated by the SEC,243 this is a place where
SEC rulemaking could prescribe various revenue and business activity
benchmarks that a company would have to meet in order to issue
securities that qualify for the opportunity program, much like the tax
shelter crackdowns of the 1980s and 1990s.244
Blocking shell companies from utilizing this program may not
deter all forms of misuse of this program. That restriction does not
foreclose the possibility that sophisticated investors will find ways to
take advantage of the tax benefits available through the OSP in a way
that is contrary to public policy. This is where active management by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the SEC, through rulemaking,
would have a role. These agencies would be tasked with creating
standards for the opportunity securities so that investors know what
securities qualify upfront. Moreover, if enterprising tax avoiders try
anything sneaky, they do so at their own peril.
One aspect of this program where policy makers and the public
may take issue is that the OSP will effectively subsidize EPMs. Despite
the cost, EPMs are essential to this solution. EPMs play a role not only
in price discovery and liquidity, but also in placing companies in front

241.
See Chuck Marr, The Tax Loophole of 2016: Like-Kind Exchange, CTR. ON
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (May 18, 2016, 4:30 PM), https://www.cbpp.org/blog/the-tax-loopholeof-2016-like-kind-exchange [https://perma.cc/7MEY-6ZWA] (explaining that the § 1031 like-kind
exchange exemption costs the government billions of dollars each year in forgone tax revenue).
242.
“Genentech is a biotechnology company dedicated to pursuing groundbreaking science
to discover and develop medicines for people with serious and life-threatening diseases.” About Us,
GENENTECH, https://www.gene.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/22QN-SXGK] (last visited Oct. 4,
2020).
243.
See Nasdaq Private Market Solutions, supra note 24.
244.
See DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION,
ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 25–30 (1999), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Corporate-Tax-Shelters-1999.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2VQ8A6XB].

2020]

OPPORTUNITY ZONE FOR PUBLIC LISTINGS

219

of investors and in forcing start-ups to seek investment banking and
capital raising advice early and often.245
Furthermore, the SEC may have to subject EPM pricing to
regulation,246 as it is possible that EPMs could charge such a high
gatekeeper fee that many companies would not be able to access the
EPM and thus obtain the benefits of the opportunity program. Without
intervention, this would limit the participants in the OSP and could dull
the desired effects on the IPO market. This shortcoming could be
mitigated by effective SEC regulation,247 enabled by the fact that EPMs
are registered broker-dealers subject to SEC regulation.248
Finally, some critics could claim that this program would
unfairly subsidize investments made by VCs, wealthy individuals, and
corporations because it offers a way to defer taxation when they sell
their investments.249 There is tremendous investment inequality,
specifically in relation to the households that are and are not invested
in the stock market.250 Although this may increase investment
concentration in the short term, it will encourage better and more
diverse investment opportunities for the investing public in the long
term.
E. Unique Benefits
This program, despite its shortcomings, would provide unique
economic benefits over the current public offering process. This program
would encourage IPOs and public offerings more broadly. It would also
not be subject to the same lobbying carveouts as the Opportunity Fund
Program251 because it is a blanket incentive for any privately held
company. A large portion of the efforts to incentivize public offerings
have been deregulatory in nature.252 Unlike prior solutions, the OSP

245.
See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 179.
246.
Cf. Rulemaking: How It Works, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answersrulemakinghtm.html [https://perma.cc/H3UB-9S2D] (last modified Apr. 6, 2011)
(explaining the SEC rulemaking process, which could be used by the SEC to limit fees that EPMs
charge should Congress delegate it that power).
247.
Cf. id.
248.
See Ibrahim, supra note 7, at 36–40.
249.
Cf. Joshua Gans, Andrew Leigh, Martin C. Schmalz & Adam Triggs, Market Power
and Inequality, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 23, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/01/23/market-power-and-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/S4MN-B9QL].
250.
Id.
251.
See Drucker & Lipton, supra note 202; see also IRS Opportunity Zone FAQ, supra note
229.
252.
See supra Sections II.A, II.B, II.C.1.
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prioritizes disclosure and market integrity by maintaining the current
regulatory structure.253
If regulation is viewed as a tax,254 one way to get the benefits of
regulation while minimizing costs is to “offset” that tax in other areas.
The OSP would offset its “regulatory taxes” with increased investor
demand. The OSP has the ability to increase the demand for public
offerings, and it ensures that US securities laws are not watered down.
The SEC will not have to further erode investor protections in order to
stimulate economic growth and capital formation. By focusing on
spurring demand, an issuer’s securities will be more valuable in the
aggregate; therefore, the cost of regulation per share issued will be
lower. This would simultaneously increase the number of public listings
and broaden access to new, high-growth investment opportunities, and
the OSP would do all of this without watering down current disclosure
and anti-fraud protections. This solution does not require wholesale
upheaval of the securities laws in the United States and would address
the lack of public offerings head on. Additionally, the OSP is
investor-centric and issuer-neutral. The OSP focuses on influencing
investor behavior rather than issuer behavior, and it provides equal
benefits to individual, accredited, and institutional investors. Should
this public offering problem continue or get worse, this innovative
solution is the answer.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decline of IPOs in the United States has limited investment
opportunities and long-term technological and economic growth. So far,
attempts to deregulate and exempt issuers from certain regulations
have not proven successful.255 Many of these regulatory changes have
produced effects contrary to their intended outcome.256 In order to
jumpstart public offerings, policy makers should consider a
demand-based approach. The OSP would fulfill that goal. The OSP
would convert EPMs from marketplaces where companies stay private
forever, locking out the public, to drivers of public offerings. By focusing
on investors and encouraging them to provide additional demand for
the public securities of new companies, this solution provides a novel
avenue for reform. Following this change, systemic pressure for public
offerings would no longer come from governments and pundits, but
253.
See supra Sections II.A, II.B, II.C.1.
254.
Cf. Hester Peirce, Meeting Market Structure Challenges Where They Are, 43 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 335, 336, 362–65 (2018).
255.
See supra Part II.
256.
See supra Part II.
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rather from investors who will benefit from investment growth and
tailored tax incentives. The OSP is not without its challenges, but it is
a bold step in reforming our current securities markets. If implemented,
the OSP would ensure that investors have equal access to investment
opportunities and would continue to support the social and
technological innovations pioneered by start-ups.
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